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CHAPTER
Continuing Eligibility
Current Labor Market Attachment
Patricia M. Anderson 
Dartmouth College
While one of the objectives of unemployment insurance (UI) is to 
reduce the financial hardship of job loss, it was not originally designed 
to be simply a welfare program for the indigent: it was to be an earned 
right for workers who become unemployed. 1 Thus, the program 
requires not only that recipients demonstrate past labor market attach 
ment but that they maintain that attachment. The exact requirements 
for continuing eligibility for UI differ across state programs but share 
certain common characteristics. Thus, in all states, claimants must 
demonstrate that they are able and available for work, and, in most 
states, they are required to undertake an active search for a new job. All 
states also impose a disqualification for refusal to accept an offer of 
suitable work, although the severity of the penalty varies. Additionally, 
states differ in their definitions of suitable and of able and available, as 
well as in deciding what constitutes an active search.
The variation in state approaches to the issue of continuing eligibil 
ity is testament to the fact that there is no one way that is clearly opti 
mal. However, the costs and benefits of the different choices made are 
often evident, as are the considerations that are likely to affect these 
costs and benefits. The next section begins to explore the various state 
approaches to continuing eligibility, starting with the able and available 
for work requirement. This discussion is followed by an analysis of 
active search requirements, and the section concludes by looking at the 
varying definitions of suitable work. The subsequent section looks at 
state practices in disqualifications, beginning with the types of disqual-
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ifications imposed by the states and the trends in state laws regarding 
this issue. Some background on the determination and appeals process 
is also provided. In the last two sections, the determinants of differ 
ences across states in continuing eligibility practices and in denial and 
appeal rates are explored, and some conclusions and directions for fur 
ther research are provided.
Work Search Issues
Able and Available for Work
A basic requirement for continuing eligibility for UI benefits is that 
the claimant be "able and available" for work. Such a stipulation may 
at first seem to be a straightforward application of the notion that UI is 
only for workers with a current labor market attachment. However, 
there are several areas of controversy. This fact is illustrated by the 
variation across states and over time in the definitions of able and avail 
able for work. While the line between ability and availability may 
appear somewhat fuzzy, the question of whether a claimant is able to 
work is essentially one concerning the physical or mental condition of 
the worker. Since the claimant must have recently been able to work in 
order to obtain monetary eligibility for UI, this issue often boils down 
to the treatment of temporary health conditions. As seen in table 4.1, 
eleven states have a special provision that claimants "are not ineligible 
if unavailable because of illness or disability occurring after filing a 
claim and registering for work if no offer of work that would have been 
suitable at time of registration is refused after beginning of such dis 
ability" (U.S. Department of Labor 1994a). Within this group, Massa 
chusetts and Alaska limit the period of time for which this waiver is in 
effect, to three and six weeks, respectively. Also, North Dakota limits 
the waiver to illnesses not covered by workers' compensation.
There has been very little change in state laws regarding ability to 
work since the issue was reviewed by Haber and Murray (1966), who 
noted that in January of 1965 there were nine states with temporary ill 
ness provisions. It is interesting that there has been almost no increase 
in this number over the past 30 years, even though at that time the
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authors commented that "the continued payment of unemployment 
compensation during a temporary illness, particularly when no suitable 
job is available, is on the side of realism and meets a real need" (pp. 
266-267). It would appear, though, that the majority of states have 
determined that this need is not best met by the UI system. The fact 
that the system is experience rated may explain this outcome, provid 
ing an argument for instead providing a separately funded disability 
insurance program. 2 As was discussed by Haber and Murray, while the 
fact that the system is experience rated does not actually mean that 
employers will pay only for unemployment for which they are directly 
responsible, this general feeling remains among employers. 3 Thus, 
periods of nonwork due to illness or disability may be seen to be out 
side the purview of an experience-rated UI system. Even without expe 
rience rating, if the system is meant only to provide insurance against 
unemployment, then other causes of non-work would fall outside the. 
scope of the system.
The treatment of availability for work is somewhat more varied than 
that of ability. As seen in table 4.1, while all states require some sort of 
availability, certain states qualify that requirement to mean available 
for suitable work, while others require only availability for work in the 
claimant's usual occupation. Clearly, availability for usual work is less 
strict than availability for suitable work, while both are more liberal 
than requiring availability for any work. In practice, though, availabil 
ity is often determined either in the affirmative based on job search 
activity or in the negative by job refusal. Thus, further exploration of 
the implications of different approaches to defining the type of work 
for which a claimant is available will be postponed until after the con 
sideration of refusal of suitable work.
One of the most discussed availability issues in the Haber and Mur 
ray study is almost a nonissue today—that of the availability of 
women. In 1960, the labor force participation rate for all women was 
37.7 percent, and for married women it was just 31.9 percent. The con 
cern at that time was that women were not truly unemployed, but rather 
were occupied with household duties and thus were not available for 
work. By 1992, though, participation rates had risen to 57.9 and 59.4 
percent, respectively (Ehrenberg and Smith 1994). Thus, the assump 
tion that women in general, and married women in particular, are only 
marginally attached to the labor market has become much less valid.
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Also 37 states had special provisions for pregnant women in 1960, 
with several states disqualifying pregnant women for the duration of 
their unemployment. Others imposed disqualifications ranging from 
four weeks to four months before childbirth and up to three months fol 
lowing delivery (Haber and Murray 1966). Again, the understanding 
was that new mothers were busy with household duties and were not 
available for work. Similarly, pregnant women were simply assumed to 
be unable to work, no matter what the actual health status of the 
woman was or the type of job. Today, federal standards prohibit such 
wholesale disqualifications (Blaustein 1993). As noted by Haber and 
Murray, pregnancy is probably best treated simply as an ability-to- 
work issue, which will differ across specific women and jobs. As was 
the case when considering temporary disability, it then becomes a 
question of the proper role of the UI system, in which it may be reason 
able to consider a separate system of maternity benefits. 4
One current availability issue to which states take slightly different 
approaches revolves around geographic location. In some states, claim 
ants are deemed unavailable for work any time that they are outside of 
a certain geographic area. For example, Illinois considers claimants to 
be unavailable if they move to an area where the opportunities are sub 
stantially less favorable than in the original locality. Oregon and Vir 
ginia both consider claimants to be unavailable if they leave their 
normal labor market for the major portion of the week, unless they can 
show that a bona fide work search was under way in the labor market in 
which their time was spent. Alabama, Michigan, Ohio, and South 
Carolina require that the claimant be available in the locality in which 
the base-period wages were earned, or in a locality where similar work 
is available or normally performed. Arizona simply requires that the 
claimant live in Arizona or in any other state or foreign country with 
which it has a reciprocal arrangement. A requirement that a claimant 
look for work where the jobs are seems reasonable, and many states 
implicitly impose similar requirements under the rubric of the active 
search requirement. However, strict geographic stipulations that are 
tied to the past employment situation may be counterproductive if con 
ditions have changed. In such cases, the state law may prove to be an 
impediment to mobility and may thus lead to inefficiencies.
Perhaps one of the most interesting issues raised in considering 
availability requirements is the treatment of students or of other indi-
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viduals undergoing training. Based on a simple test of availability, 
many, if not most, individuals in school or training would be consid 
ered ineligible for benefits. In 1960, only a handful of states had provi 
sions under which individuals in approved training programs could be 
considered available. By January of 1966, however, 22 states had such 
provisions, stimulated at least in part by debates surrounding the Area 
Redevelopment Act and the Manpower Development and Training Act 
([MDTA] Haber and Murray 1966). Today, in order to receive the nor 
mal tax credit under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 
states must not deny benefits to otherwise eligible individuals attending 
an approved training course. Thus, all state laws contain such provi 
sions, although states may use any standard to approve training 
courses. In most cases approved training includes only vocational or 
basic education, so that most regularly enrolled students remain 
unavailable (U.S. Department of Labor 1994a).
As was the case with temporary disability insurance or maternity 
benefits, one could argue that training allowances are best handled out 
side the UI system. In fact, the MDTA program did provide for such 
allowances. Additionally, Haber and Murray indicate that, based on 
experience rating concerns that have been discussed, some employers 
opposed the new training provisions enacted at that time. A possible 
key to understanding the difference in the treatment of the issues of 
training and disability may lie in recognizing the different long-term 
implications of each. Clearly, looser availability requirements result in 
more current benefit payments by the state. However, in the case of 
training programs, it is possible that the investment in human capital 
could result in more stable employment in the future, leading to benefit 
savings in the long run. Additionally, earnings increases due to this 
investment may raise state UI tax receipts, although this benefit will be 
limited due to the low UI taxable wage base. 5
Several experiments have been undertaken that attempt to measure 
the impact of training programs on UI outcomes. 6 For example, in 
Texas, New Jersey, and Buffalo, New York, short-term (either on-the- 
job or classroom) training was offered to dislocated workers. None of 
these three demonstrations found a significant impact of short-term 
training on earnings or employment (U.S. Department of Labor 
1994b). However, the Texas study looked only at the first year follow 
ing training, while in Buffalo only the first six months were considered,
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so any possible long-term impacts would not be detected in these stud 
ies. Only the New Jersey experiment had a long-term follow-up, 
although in that case the evidence on the likelihood of long-run bene 
fits (Anderson, Corson, and Decker 1991) was mixed. 7 While the earn 
ings and UI experience of the Job Search Assistance (JSA)-plus- 
training group in New Jersey were not significantly different from the 
experience of JSA-only group in the four years following the experi 
ment, only a small fraction of the JSA-plus-training group took up the 
offer of training. Although conclusions based only on those receiving 
training are likely to be contaminated by selection issues, there is evi 
dence that UI receipt in the years following the initial claim was 
slightly lower for the training recipients, while earnings were to some 
extent higher.
Programs not targeted specifically at dislocated workers have shown 
somewhat more positive effects on earnings (U.S. Department of Labor 
1994b). For example, experiments undertaken at the San Jose Center 
for Employment and Training (GET) found that training resulted in 
earnings gains averaging more than $1,000 per year. Similarly, evalua 
tion of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) indicated that adults 
had earnings gains in the second year after completing training that 
averaged around $850. In both cases, the training programs were deter 
mined to have been cost effective from a societal viewpoint. Thus, 
while the evidence is somewhat mixed overall, there does exist some 
support for the idea of long-run savings to the UI system from encour 
aging training receipt.
Considerations of such possible long-run benefits of training cannot 
be the whole story behind the favorable treatment of training programs 
by the UI system, however, since such benefits are likely to accrue 
from many types of human capital investment. In fact, there is mount 
ing evidence on the growing importance of general education to labor 
market outcomes. 8 As stated previously, though, most states make no 
exception for regularly enrolled students. In fact, as seen in table 4. 1, 
many states have special provisions showing that students are ineligi 
ble while attending school, with seven states explicitly continuing that 
ineligibility during school vacation periods, when the claimant is argu 
ably available for work. Many of the states do qualify the blanket ineli 
gibility of students, however. For example, Kansas and North Carolina 
do not disqualify those in full-time work concurrent with their school
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attendance. Similarly, Minnesota, Nebraska, and North Dakota allow 
receipt for students if the major portion of their base-period earnings 
came from services performed while in school. Other states' excep 
tions are somewhat more restrictive. Thus, Ohio indicates that individ 
uals who become unemployed while attending school and whose base- 
period wages were at least partially earned while attending school will 
meet the requirement if they are available for suitable employment on 
any shift. Oklahoma will not disqualify students if they offer to quit 
school, adjust class hours, or change shifts in order to secure employ 
ment.
Job Search Activity
As noted earlier, one indication of availability for work is the act of 
searching for work. All states require registration at a local employ 
ment office as evidence of job search. Most states additionally require 
that claimants undertake an "active search" for work. States differ in 
how this requirement is imposed, but typically claimants must provide 
evidence of employer contacts each week. 9 Additionally, after some 
period of unemployment, an eligibility review meeting with UI staff is 
often required. As noted by Haber and Murray, one possible drawback 
to such active search requirements is that they may "result in a great 
deal of wasted effort that is a nuisance to employers and demoralizing 
to the worker" (pp. 268-269). Nonetheless, the number of states with 
an active search requirement has increased from thirty in 1966 to forty 
in 1994. Several states (Michigan, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, 
and Virginia), do allow for flexibility in reaction to changing economic 
conditions. Similarly, the provision is not mandatory in several other 
states (Oklahoma, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin).
While one intention of work search requirements, like other con 
tinuing eligibility requirements, is to prevent the UI system from 
becoming a welfare program, an obvious side benefit may be to assist 
in the reemployment of unemployed workers. The question then arises 
as to what sort of requirements can best meet these dual goals. Several 
experiments have been carried out assessing the impact of different 
approaches to work search. As noted by Meyer (1995), since most of 
these experiments offered additional job finding services, as well as 
imposed additional job reporting requirements, it is difficult to untan-
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gle whether it was the extra services or the tightened eligibility require 
ments that led to the observed outcomes. In general, the more intensive 
treatments were found to have resulted in reduced UI receipt and 
increased earnings that outweighed the increased administrative 
costs. 10
Only the Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment also 
evaluated the effect of lowering the work search requirements. The 
results from this demonstration indicate that abandoning an active 
search policy would increase UI outlays by $265 per claimant, making 
it unlikely that any savings from reduced monitoring costs would be 
large enough to offset this amount. In fact, the administrative cost of 
the most intensive reemployment services tested in Washington was 
estimated to be only $14.50, while that treatment reduced UI payments 
by $70 per claimant (Johnson and Klepinger 1994).
A second recent area of research concerns self-employment. For a 
displaced worker, it is conceivable that the most productive reemploy 
ment option is self-employment. However, individuals in the process of 
starting up their own business would not meet the requirements of 
being available and searching for work. Thus, the search requirements 
of the UI system may actually serve as an impediment to productive 
employment in this case. Recently, demonstration projects were under 
taken in Washington and Massachusetts to determine the impact of 
allowing for at least some claimants continuing access to the UI system 
while they are starting up their own business. 11 In both cases, treatment 
group members were more likely to become self-employed. Addition 
ally, the length of unemployment spells was reduced. However, only a 
small number of claimants actually became self-employed, implying 
that the overall effects on unemployment were negligible.
Based on the encouraging results of demonstrations such as these, 
federal legislation was enacted in 1993 to allow for self-employment 
assistance programs conditional on the provision of increased reem 
ployment services. Under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act, states are permitted to establish self-employment 
assistance programs that allow selected claimants who are engaged in 
establishing a business to continue to receive periodic unemployment 
payments (Runner 1994).
Additionally, Public Law (P.L.) 103-152 was enacted in November 
of 1993 and requires states to establish and implement a Worker Profil-
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ing and Reemployment Services System. This law defines such a sys 
tem as one that
(A) identifies which claimants will be likely to exhaust regular 
compensation and will need job search assistance services to 
make a successful transition to new employment;
(B) refers claimants identified pursuant to subparagraph (A) to 
reemployment services, such as job search assistance services, 
available under any State or Federal law;
(C) collects follow-up information relating to the services 
received by such claimants and the employment outcomes for 
such claimants subsequent to receiving such services and utilizes 
such information in making identifications pursuant to subpara 
graph (A); and
(D) meets such other requirements as the Secretary of Labor 
determines are appropriate.
The law adds a
requirement that, as a condition of eligibility for regular compen 
sation for any week, any claimant who has been referred to reem 
ployment services pursuant to the profiling system under 
subsection (j)(l)(B) participate in such services or in similar ser 
vices unless the State agency charged with the administration of 
the State law determines -
(A) such claimant has completed such services; or
(B) there is justifiable cause for such claimant's failure to partici 
pate in such services (U.S. Department of Labor 1994b, p. 18).
Thus, the law tightens continuing eligibility standards for claimants 
identified as likely to exhaust benefits by requiring them to participate 
in enhanced reemployment services.
These new programs are arguably the most significant changes to 
continuing eligibility requirements in quite some time. Unfortunately, 
it is too soon to evaluate their impacts. It will be interesting to study the 
effect of the laws, not only on claimants' unemployment durations and 
reemployment outcomes, but also on eligibility determinations. One 
would expect that P.L. 103-152 would increase disqualifications, as 
claimants who would otherwise have been eligible can now be disqual 
ified due to a failure to participate in the new services. At the same
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time, the availability of self-employment assistance would reduce dis 
qualifications. Clearly, following up on the impact of these programs 
will be of much interest in the future.
The discussion so far has focused only on the search activity of a 
permanently displaced worker, but an important source of wasteful 
search may be that undertaken by those who are awaiting recall. 12 
Thus, several states make exceptions for these claimants. For example, 
Delaware, Michigan, Ohio, Arkansas, and Missouri each specify that a 
claimant is deemed available and actively searching if the employer 
notifies the agency that the layoff is temporary. The proper treatment of 
those who expect recall, but are not given an explicit recall date is per 
haps less clear. On the one hand, a large fraction of those who expect 
recall are actually recalled. 13 However, recent studies have found that 
those whose expectations are incorrect have longer unemployment 
spells (Katz and Meyer 1990 and Anderson 1992, for example). In 
many ways, then, the treatment of those expecting recall may really be 
considered as part of the broader question of whether search require 
ments should be revised during the length of the claimant's spell. 
Since, in practice, most states incorporate such changes under the 
scope of defining what constitutes suitable work, it will be discussed in 
this context.
Refusal of Suitable Work
All states provide for disqualification due to a refusal of suitable 
work. The states differ, however, in their approaches to defining what is 
suitable and in the penalties imposed for a refusal. Because of concern 
for labor standards, FUTA requires all states to provide that
compensation shall not be denied in such State to any otherwise 
eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of 
the following conditions:
(A) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lock 
out, or other labor dispute;
(B) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are 
substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing 
for similar work in the locality;
(C) if as a condition of being employed the individual would be 
required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from
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joining any bona fide labor organization (U.S. Department of 
Labor 1994a, pp. 4-9).
Beyond this, states are free to use any criteria to define the suitability 
of a job, with most states using such things as the degree of risk to the 
claimant's health, safety and morals; the physical fitness and prior 
training, experience, and earnings; the length of unemployment, and 
prospects for securing local work in a customary occupation; and the 
distance of the available work from the claimant's residence (U.S. 
Department of Labor 1994a). 14
As was mentioned when discussing the role of recall, it is possible 
that unrealistic expectations can result in delays in reemployment. 
However, the problem is not restricted to recall expectations, but may 
also apply more generally to the case of a worker who is not well 
informed about the wage offer distribution. Several states explicitly 
incorporate this type of thinking into their statutes, broadening the def 
inition of suitable work as the spell continues. Many states adjust the 
definition of suitability based on earnings, although the minimum wage 
supersedes any other lower bound. For example, after 25 weeks of ben 
efits have been received in any year, Florida declares suitable any job 
that pays at least 120 percent of the individual's weekly benefit 
amount. North Dakota specifies that, after 18 weeks, any job paying 
wages equal to the weekly benefit amount will be considered suitable. 
Iowa lowers the amount of gross weekly wages required for a job to be 
considered suitable in a stepwise fashion. Thus, in the first 5 weeks it 
must be at least 100 percent of the individual's high-quarter weekly 
wage, but, in weeks 6 to 12, just 75 percent, followed by 70 percent in 
weeks 13 to 18 and then 65 percent after that.
Thus, if misinformation about the job market led the individual's 
reservation wage to be set too high, requirements such as these that 
quickly revise reservation wages downward may not result in earnings 
losses due to inefficient job matches. Additionally, there will be the 
clear short-term gains to the UI system from decreased benefit pay 
ments, due either to earlier job acceptance or to more disqualifications. 
However, to the extent that the individual's reservation wage was set 
appropriately, such requirements may lead to earnings losses and thus 
result in long-term costs. Evidence on the role of Ul-induced changes 
in unemployment on reemployment earnings is somewhat mixed. Early
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studies, such as those by Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976), Burgess and 
Kingston (1976), Classen (1977), and Holen (1977), found generally 
positive effects of UI benefits on both duration and reemployment 
earnings. Such results would indicate that the subsidy to search pro 
vided by UI allowed claimants to obtain better jobs, and by extension 
would imply that there could be losses from earlier returns to work. 
However, recent evidence from several bonus experiments indicates 
that the shorter spells induced by the bonus did not come at the 
expense of lower earnings (Meyer 1995), tempering this conclusion.
The prediction of long-term losses from less search is also depen 
dent upon the proposition that on-the-job search is significantly less 
efficient than search while not employed. The relative inefficiency of 
on-the-job search is a basic tenet of theoretical models of search unem 
ployment, but the empirical evidence is mixed. For example, 
Gottschalk and Maloney (1985) note that about half of all job changers 
are never unemployed, implying that their job search was on the job 
rather than off. Additionally, Blau and Robins (1990) find that the offer 
rate per employer contact is higher for employed searchers than for 
unemployed searchers. These findings would then indicate that on-the- 
job search may be just as efficient if not more so than unemployed 
search. By contrast, though, Holzer (1987) finds evidence that at least 
among the young, unemployed search is more effective. Also, individ 
uals do quit into unemployment (about 37 percent of voluntary separa 
tions according to Gottschalk and Maloney), which would indicate that 
there are advantages to unemployed search for these individuals. Thus, 
the issue remains unsettled.
Beyond making a decision on the definition of suitable work, states 
must determine what constitutes an offer and a refusal. For example, if 
a claimant walks past a store with a "Help Wanted" sign in the window, 
has a job been offered and refused? As noted by Haber and Murray, "it 
is generally agreed that it must be clear to the claimant that he is being 
asked to take a job, that the conditions of the job are specified, and that 
definite acceptance or rejection of the offer is required" (p. 291). Ques 
tionable situations may arise, however. For example, an offer may not 
be made because the employer finds the person to be unsuitable. 
Depending on the cause of this nonoffer, it may still be reasonable to 
disqualify the worker. If individuals deliberately sabotage their reem 
ployment chances because they do not want to have to take the job, it is
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essentially equivalent to refusing an offer. Questionable situations such 
as these are typically considered on a case-by-case basis, so that in 
some instances it may be determined that an offer has in fact been 
refused, while in others it may be determined that a definite offer was 
not made.
Overall, the considerations that will affect the costs and benefits of 
different approaches to the definitions of suitable work and of an offer 
and a refusal are clear. However, given that the actual size of the rela 
tive costs and benefits remains undetermined, it is not surprising that 
the states have chosen to take many different approaches. No matter 
the definitions used, all states impose some type of disqualification 
once a determination has been made that an offer of suitable work was 
refused. Note that this is in contrast to the approach taken to ineligibil- 
ity due to inability or unavailability for work. In those cases, payments 
are withheld for weeks in which the claimant is unable to work or is 
unavailable, but will be resumed when the condition changes. Refusal 
of suitable work instead leads to denial of benefits for a specific time 
period following the refusal, with determination of this time period dif 




There are three main approaches taken by the states in imposing dis 
qualifications for refusal of suitable work: disqualifying applicants for 
a fixed number of weeks, for a variable number of weeks, or for the 
duration of unemployment. 15 As seen in table 4.2, the majority of states 
(thirty-nine) disqualify claimants for the duration of unemployment, 
while only eight states impose a variable week disqualification, and 
just six states impose a disqualification of a fixed number of weeks. 16 
The decision to impose a durational disqualification (as it is called), 
rather than a fixed or variable week disqualification, reflects a basic 
difference in assumptions about the source of unemployment. In limit 
ing the length of the disqualification, a state is implicitly assuming that
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after some period of time, general economic conditions are more 
responsible for the claimant's continued unemployment than is his or 
her earlier refusal of work. Additionally, this approach recognizes the 
fact that, in practice, the distinction between suitable and unsuitable 
work may be a fine one. This recognition is especially relevant to the 
case of variable week disqualifications, as it is possible to impose 
lower penalties in situations that seem particularly unclear. Recall, for 
example, the earlier discussion of difficulties that may arise in deter 
mining whether or not an offer has been made and refused.
By contrast, the assumption behind the use of durational disqualifi 
cations is that, had the claimants not refused the job, they would now 
be employed, and thus continued unemployment of any length should 
be considered voluntary and beyond the scope of the UI system. Most 
of the states imposing a durational disqualification also specify that a 
claimant must work a given amount of time or earn a certain amount 
before requalifying for benefits. In theory, then, the disqualification 
may last beyond the duration of unemployment and thus takes on a 
punitive characteristic. For example, consider a worker who at some 
point after being disqualified for a refusal accepts a new job. If the indi 
vidual is then laid off from the new job prior to working long enough 
or earning enough to requalify, this new spell of unemployment will be 
uncompensated for as long as it lasts. In practice, however, the require 
ments for requalification are relatively low in most states, and thus the 
actual number of claimants affected in this way by such provisions is 
likely to be small. Perhaps more clearly punitive in nature is the prac 
tice of reducing benefits in conjunction with a disqualification. The 
reduction amount varies but is often set equal to the weekly benefit 
amount multiplied by the number of weeks of disqualification. Thus, in 
terms of future eligibility, it is as if the claimant collected benefits dur 
ing the disqualification period.
As was the case with disability provision, the actual trends in state 
laws since 1966 have generally conflicted with the spirit of the discus 
sion by Haber and Murray. At that time, they stated that "we would 
recommend against disqualification for the duration of unemployment 
in cases of refusal of suitable work" (p. 304). Despite such recommen 
dations, the number of states using durational disqualifications along 
with requalifying requirements has grown substantially. In 1966, there 
were twenty-three states that disqualified a claimant for the duration of
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unemployment after a refusal of suitable work, while today that num 
ber has risen to thirty-nine. The tally of states reducing the number of 
weeks of benefits for which a worker is subsequently eligible has actu 
ally declined slightly, though, from 15 to 13. However, this is a fairly 
small change considering the strong statement by Haber and Murray: 
"Reduction or cancellation of benefit rights is punitive in character and 
has no proper place in an insurance program" (p. 305).
The Determination and Appeals Process
Given the severity of and possibly long-term consequences of dis 
qualification, it is important to provide for an appeals process. In fact, 
federal law requires that there be an "opportunity for a fair hearing 
before an impartial tribunal, for all individuals whose claims for unem 
ployment compensation are denied" (U.S. Department of Labor 
1994a). All states allow not only individuals whose claims are denied, 
but also employers who have an interest, to appeal decisions on claims. 
Most states also provide for two appeal stages before cases can be 
taken to the state courts, with the decision of the first-stage appeals 
body being final in the absence of an appeal. Some states do allow for 
reconsideration of a decision within the appeal period, however. States 
are approximately evenly split between those that have a special board 
of review, board of appeals, or appeals board, and those where an exist 
ing commission or agency head handles appeals. In the former case, 
the members generally represent labor and employers, and, in some 
cases, the public. In the latter case, the appeals board is often the inde 
pendent commission that administers the UI system in the state. 
Finally, all states also provide for judicial review by the courts, with 
the time limit generally ranging from 10 to 50 days.
Prior to the appeals stage, an initial determination was obviously 
made. The actual process of making a determination on whether an 
infraction has taken place is a multistep one. First, the state must iden 
tify that a situation exists requiring further investigation. The state then 
collects information on the circumstances from the claimant and from 
any other interested parties. This fact-finding procedure is followed by 
a formal hearing, during which the evidence is weighed and rules are 
interpreted as to how they apply to the case at hand. While these same 
basic steps are followed in all states, Corson, Hershey, and Kerachsky
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(1986) find that there is significant variation across states in carrying 
out these procedures. The result is a wide variance in the number of 
determinations made in each state, and, ultimately, in the number of 
denials.
Given this variation, for some states the appeals process may be a 
key component of the system. Reliance on appeals may be especially 
common if the laws regarding continuing eligibility are exceptionally 
unclear or are administered in an inconsistent manner. Based on a sur 
vey of UI directors in each state carried out by the Interstate Confer 
ence of Employment Security Agencies (ICESA), the Advisory 
Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC) indicates that such 
problems are particularly likely in the case of refusal of suitable work. 
For example, while 42 states will consider a claimant to still be eligible 
if the refusal of suitable work is for "good cause," the survey reveals 
that the definition of good cause is generally determined on a case-by- 
case basis. Additionally, a follow-up survey of five states designed to 
assess the internal consistency of such determinations within a state 
found that three of the five states provided inconsistent responses to the 
question of refusal of suitable work. The ACUC goes on to note that 
"the general lack of published information regarding state nonmone- 
tary eligibility conditions is likely to cause misunderstandings regard 
ing nonmonetary eligibility. Such misunderstandings harm both 
claimants and employers, and also may place strains on resources of 
the UI system by causing additional appeals" (ACUC 1995).
In fact, total appeals have increased over threefold in the past 
twenty-five years or so, reaching 1.2 million in 1994 (ACUC 1996). 17 
This growth took place both at the lower authority and higher authority 
level, but higher authority appeals have remained a fairly constant pro 
portion of lower authority appeals over time. By contrast, the number 
of lower authority appeals has risen, not just in levels, but as a fraction 
both of initial claims and of total denials. A majority of appeals are 
filed over separation issues: nonseparation issues such as those dis 
cussed in this chapter made up just 33 percent of all appeals in 1994. 
On the other hand, nonseparation appeals as a percentage of nonsepa 
ration denials have doubled since 1971, increasing from 8 percent to 16 
percent. Looking at the type of nonseparation issue, appeals related to 
both able and available for work and refusal of suitable work have
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fallen over this time period, while all other nonseparation appeals have 
increased.
Claimants continue to file appeals at a higher rate than do employ 
ers, but total employer appeals have increased in recent years. The rate 
of claimant appeals in 1994 was about the same as in 1983. 18 By con 
trast, the employer appeal rate doubled in that period. At the same time, 
the success rate of employers has been falling, both at the lower 
authority and higher authority level. It would seem, then, that employ 
ers have become more likely to appeal any given claim. Such behavior 
would be rational if either the costs of appealing had fallen or if the 
benefits of doing so had risen. One possible contributor to lower costs 
of appeal is the increased availability of third-party administrators, or 
so-called UI service bureaus. At the national level, these include such 
firms as the Frank Gates Service Company and the Frick Company. 
Similar services may also be provided by local associations. For exam 
ple, the Employers Group (formerly the Merchants and Manufacturers 
Association and Federated Employers) provides human resources man 
agement to "nearly 5000 California private and public sector employ 
ers of every size and business classification" and lays claim to being 
"the nation's leading non-profit human resources management associa 
tion." 19
As is typical of UI service bureaus, the Employers Group offers to 
provide a multifaceted cost control program that covers six major 
activities: counseling, training, claims handling, auditing, analysis and 
reporting. Among other things, such UI service bureaus will take the 
lead in protesting claims and will provide representation at appeals 
hearings. These services are likely not only to reduce the cost of 
appeals (the service is generally covered as part of the overall agree 
ment with the company) but may also increase the benefits if skilled 
representation raises the probability of a successful appeal. Studies of 
the appeals process provide somewhat mixed evidence on this proposi 
tion. Using 1994 data on appeals in Wisconsin, Ashenfelter and Levine 
(1995) find that retaining representation has no effect on the 
employer's success rate, although claimants who obtain representation 
are more likely to win. Kritzer (1995) comes to a similar conclusion, 
also with data from Wisconsin, but he notes that the most effective rep 
resentation stems from expert knowledge of the UI system. Thus, ser 
vice bureaus may be more successful than the average representative. It
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is important to realize, however, that there are significant differences 
across states in the total appeals rate, and thus the Wisconsin experi 
ence may not be typical. While less up to date, evidence in Rubin 
(1980), using over 11,000 appeals cases in twenty-four states from 
April of 1979, is supportive of these findings. Rubin concludes that, 
although claimants are more likely to win an appeal if represented, 
employers, on average, are actually less likely to win if represented. 
Each of these studies finds no significant overall benefit to employers 
of being represented, but the ACUC (1996) does find a positive effect 
for both employers and claimants. 20 While the evidence is weak for the 
positive benefits of representation, it still remains true that the costs of 
appeal are reduced via service bureaus, so we cannot dismiss the possi 
bility that their increased use has affected the appeals procedure.
In sum, a recognition that there may be no "best" approach may well 
be the key factor in understanding why there appear to be so many dif 
ferences across states in their approaches to the issue of continuing eli 
gibility. For example, states face a precarious balancing act in setting 
policies on disqualifications for refusal of suitable work. A job that is 
clearly suitable for one individual may be just as clearly unsuitable for 
another individual. Thus, while there may generally be an advantage to 
explicit eligibility laws that are consistently applied, there is the real 
risk of losing the flexibility to deal with claimants as individuals, with 
the resultant determinations possibly being suboptimal. Consequently, 
we observe different practices and different outcomes across states. 
Possible determinants of this variation are considered in the next sec 
tion.
Determinants of State Practices and Outcomes
Differences in State Continuing Eligibility Rules
While the costs and benefits of the various state strategies are fairly 
evident, it remains difficult to fully discern the causes of the differ 
ences in legislation across states. Some possible candidates include the 
political climate of the state, the level of experience rating, and the 
health of the state trust funds. It is hard to quantify such considerations,
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but some basic indicators of these state attributes are available. In an 
attempt to evaluate whether these types of factors seem promising as 
explanations of state differences in approaches to continuing UI eligi 
bility, I estimated some very simple empirical models. Specifically, 
probit models were estimated on the probability of not having special 
disability laws, the probability of requiring availability for suitable, 
usual, or any work; the probability of having special student restric 
tions; and the probability of having variable, fixed, or durational dis 
qualifications for refusal of suitable work.
The state characteristics used as explanatory variables are the aver 
age fraction of the state legislature that was Democratic over the 1980s, 
the fraction of that time period during which the governor was a Dem 
ocrat, the average experience rating index (ERI) over the 1988-1992 
period, and the state reserve ratio multiple (RRM) at both the peak 
(1989) and trough (1992) of the business cycle. 21 The political vari 
ables are meant to capture the inherent "liberalness" of the state and 
should be negatively related to stricter legislation. By contrast, the ERI 
should be positively related to stricter measures, since greater experi 
ence rating should increase employer opposition. The use of averages 
over past years is meant to be a proxy for long-run values of these 
attributes. The role of the RRM measures is slightly less clear, since 
stricter states are likely to see their reserves fall less quickly in a down 
turn, while states with generally lower reserves should be less likely to 
have more generous laws. It may be most appropriate, then, to think of 
the RRM at the peak as reflecting the adequacy of the state's reserves 
more generally, conditional on the RRM at the trough. Thus, the two 
measures are entered separately, rather than using an average, with the 
coefficient on the 1989 measure (the peak) generally being the one of 
most interest.
Table 4.3 presents the results of this exercise, along with a summary 
of the expected signs of the coefficients. For each of the models, a pos 
itive coefficient indicates that this state characteristic implies more 
severe provisions. Given the simplicity of this exploratory analysis, it 
is perhaps not surprising that the explanatory value of the models is 
generally low. Many of the coefficients are of the expected sign, 
although the majority of coefficients are not significantly different 
from zero.22 Taking each of the basic state characteristics in turn, we 
see that having a Democratic governor is generally negatively related
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NOTES: Positive coefficients imply increased seventy of state provisions. Models (1), (3), and (4) are probit models on the presence of 
the named provision. Models (2) and (5) are ordered probits on the type of named provision. Standard errors are in parentheses. See the 
text for a complete description of explanatory variables. All models exclude Alaska, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Nebraska. 
Model (1) also excludes those states with separate disability programs. Model (5) also excludes states with combination provisions, 
indicates significance at the 90% level, **at the 95% level.
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to stricter state provisions, as expected. The one exception is that a 
Democratic governor is not negatively related to increasingly strict 
designations of the type of work for which an applicant must be able 
and available. Results are slightly more mixed for the impact of a Dem 
ocratic legislature. There is a significantly negative effect on the proba 
bility of having stricter disqualification provisions for refusal of 
suitable work. The expected negative sign is also found for having a 
special student disqualification provision and for having increasingly 
strict designations of the type of work for which an applicant must be 
able and available, although these are not significantly different from 
zero. While still insignificant, the estimated impact of a Democratic 
legislature on the probability of not having a disability provision and 
on having an active search requirement is unexpectedly positive. Esti 
mates of the effect of the state experience rating index are always 
insignificant, and the signs are also mixed. Only the peak reserve ratio 
multiple (1989) provides the predicted estimated effect for all five 
models. However, only the probability of having an active search 
requirement is significantly reduced. A corresponding, significantly 
positive effect on active search is estimated for the reserve ratio multi 
ple at the trough (1992). While this exercise is suggestive of the types 
of state attributes that may be important, the overall results are disap 
pointing and leave many questions unanswered.
Differences in Disqualification Rates
Not only do states take different approaches to setting the require 
ments for continuing eligibility for UI benefits, but there are significant 
differences across states in the determination of eligibility. Table 4.4 
presents denial rates for able and available for work issues and for 
refusal of suitable work, by state, for 1982 and 1991. 23 In each case the 
rate is presented as the number of denials per 1,000 claimant contacts. 
The table also provides the mean and median denial rate for each year, 
as well as the standard deviation of the mean. Looking first at denials 
for able and available issues, the mean and median in 1982 are 5.4 and 
4.9, respectively, but rates range from just 0.6 in Tennessee to 21.9 in 
South Dakota. In 1991, the mean and median are 5.9 and 4.3, respec 
tively, and the range is similar to that of 1982, although now Utah reg 
isters the highest rate of 21.4, while Tennessee remains the lowest, at
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0.5. Overall, the variation across states in 1991 is slightly larger than in 
1982.
A similar pattern is seen for the denial rate for refusal of suitable 
work, although the levels are much lower. In this case, the mean is 0.2 
and 0.3 in 1982 and 1991 respectively, with a median of 0.2 in both 
years. Rates in 1982 range from negligible in the District of Columbia, 
Washington, and Wyoming to 0.7 in South Dakota. Similarly, in 1991, 
rates are negligible in the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and 
Montana, but reach 1.3 in Oklahoma. As was the case earlier, the varia 
tion across states is slightly larger in 1991 than in 1982. There is, how 
ever, a strong correlation between denial rates in the two years within 
states. For example, as shown in table 4.5, the correlation between 
denial rates for able and available for work over the two years is 0.6927 
and is significantly different from zero. Note that a correlation of 1 
would imply that the two rates were identical, while a correlation of 0 
would imply that there was no relationship across the two years. Look 
ing at disqualifications for refusal of suitable work, there is a signifi 
cant correlation of 0.5148 between the two years. There is also a 
correlation between the two different types of disqualifications within 
each year. This correlation is strongest in 1982, where it is 0.5699 and 
statistically significant. The correlation falls to 0.2190 in 1991 and is 
not significant at conventional levels.
Table 4.5 Correlations of State Denial Rates
Able and available 1982
























Refusal of suitable 
work 1982





NOTES' Probability of obtaining the estimated correlation if the true correlation was zero is 
given in parentheses All correlations are calaculated based on the state denial rates shown in 
table 4 4
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These strong within-state correlations, combined with the large dif 
ferences across states raise the question of what the key determinants 
of denial rates are. This topic is explored in some detail by Corson, 
Hershey, and Kerachsky (1986). They divide the factors likely to affect 
denial rates into five categories: (1) the characteristics of state laws, (2) 
the thoroughness of the administrative process in UI determinations, 
(3) the generosity of UI benefits, (4) the state of the economy, and (5) 
the general philosophy of the state towards UI claimants. Using quar 
terly data on denial rates by state from 1964 through 1981, they then 
estimate separate models for denials for able and available and for 
refusal of suitable work issues. In both models, state laws, other UI 
characteristics and external economic factors are used as explanatory 
variables.
Results from this exercise are generally disappointing, with only a 
few significant effects and some coefficients of the unexpected sign. 
For example, only the wage replacement ratio, insured unemployment 
rate, percentage insured unemployed in construction, percentage 
insured unemployed in manufacturing, and percentage men were sig 
nificant in both cases, and, for refusal of suitable work, the presence of 
durational disqualifications was also significant. In all cases, each of 
these variables was estimated to have a negative effect on the denial 
rate. The negative effects of the composition of the insured unem 
ployed were as expected, since these groups are more likely to be on 
temporary layoff and thus may be exempt from many of the require 
ments. The negative effect of the overall insured unemployment rate is 
supportive of the idea that in a weak economy there are fewer job 
offers to refuse. Its role in affecting denials for able and available 
issues is less clear. It may be that claims examiners are simply less 
likely to deny benefits when times are bad. Alternatively, active search 
requirements are often weakened during downturns, and able and 
available determinations are strongly influenced by findings on active 
search. Somewhat more puzzling is the role of the benefit replacement 
rate. The authors theorize that the replacement rate should enter posi 
tively, since more generous benefits should induce more marginally eli 
gible people to make claims, and thus the negative effect can be 
considered surprising.
A similar model is estimated in ACUC (1996) on overall denials for 
nonseparation issues for states from 1978 to 1990, with correspond-
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ingly disappointing results. Only lower reserve ratios, lower unem 
ployment rates, lower unionization rates, and unexpectedly shorter 
duration of UI benefits were significantly related to higher nonsepara- 
tion denial rates. Thus, many significant across-state differences 
remain. Interestingly, some apparent regional patterns to the differ 
ences were found. For example, many of the states in the West have 
denial rates above what would be predicted from the model, while sev 
eral states in the Southeast have denial rates below that predicted from 
the model. The study notes that similar behaviors by contiguous states 
may be interpreted either as cooperation or as competition among these 
states.
Corson, Hershey, and Kerachsky (1986) follow up their regression 
research with an in-depth process analysis carried out in six states. 
While the state-level regression models provide fairly unsatisfactory 
results, several conclusions emerge from this work. First, the authors 
find that a key factor is the rate at which states detect issues (referred to 
as making a determination), rather than the rate at which such determi 
nations are denied. They then note that these determination rates "seem 
to reflect three general factors that vary from state to state: (1) the 
scope of work-search requirements and the methods used to monitor 
compliance; (2) the purposefulness and frequency with which claim 
ants are questioned about ongoing eligibility issues; and (3) the consis 
tency with which ongoing claims are reviewed." Additionally, they 
note that the organization of fact-finding and adjudication is likely to 
affect denial rates, with there being three main variable factors across 
states. These factors are identified as "the extent to which they insisted 
on conducting all fact-finding within the context of a recognized deter 
mination process," the "extent to which states relied on in-person inter 
views," and the extent to which the same staff person carried out both 
the fact-finding work and the adjudication.
While such conclusions are undoubtedly valid, they do not answer 
the more fundamental question of why there are such differences in 
these factors across states. As before, consideration of the costs and 
benefits of the approaches is likely to be informative. Many of the 
types of issues that should be considered have already been discussed 
in related contexts. For example, determination and denial rates are 
likely to be higher/lower if there are more/fewer requirements for con 
tinuing eligibility. Thus, the earlier analyses of special disability provi-
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sions, special student provisions, and of the definition of suitable work 
are applicable for ascertaining the likely costs and benefits of higher 
and lower denial rates. Few details are available on the administrative 
costs of the different approaches, although the work search experi 
ments that were discussed provide some information. It is certainly 
likely, however, that the marginal cost of ferreting out every last ineli 
gible claimant would vastly exceed the cost of maintaining such per 
sons on the UI rolls. There may also be additional benefits from stricter 
enforcement in the form of deterrent effects. That is, unemployed indi 
viduals may not even apply if they think they will be denied UI bene 
fits, although this form of deterrence is likely to be much more 
important for initial eligibility determinations than for continuing eligi 
bility issues. However, Corson and Nicholson (1988) do find some sig 
nificant effects of continuing eligibility variables on the ratio of the 
insured unemployment rate to the total unemployment rate. Similarly, 
Blank and Card (1991) find that the disqualification rate has a signifi 
cantly negative effect on the take-up rate, as measured by the ratio of 
insured unemployment to initially eligible unemployment. It is likely, 
though, that the mechanism of the effect is through increased denials 
rather than via reduced applications for benefits.
Across-state differences in the rate of appeals of nonseparation 
issues have not been studied, but consideration of the results of analy 
ses of total appeals may still be useful. The variation in appeals rates 
across states is large. ACUC (1996) notes that appeals as a percentage 
of denials as of 1994 range from highs of 73 percent and 56 percent in 
the District of Columbia and New Mexico, respectively, to lows of 4 
percent and 5 percent in Nebraska and Idaho, respectively. As has gen 
erally been the case in this section, the results from attempts to explain 
such cross-state differences are somewhat disappointing. ACUC 
reports the results from regressions on appeals by employers and 
appeals by claimants, as well as on success rates by those groups, using 
state data for 1978 to 1990. While several variables are associated with 
higher appeals rates, the across-state differences remain significant. 
Again, there appears to be some geographic clustering, with a group of 
Midwestern states and a group of Southwestern states each exhibiting 
higher claimant appeals rates than would be expected. There is no sign 
of such geographic clustering in employer appeals rates. Similarly, sev 
eral variables are associated with higher success rates, but the overall
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model fit very poorly. In this case, there was no apparent geographic 
clustering.
Conclusions
All states impose some sort of continuing eligibility requirements 
on UI recipients. While the specifics of the state laws vary, the basic 
requirements can be simply summarized. Claimants must demonstrate 
that they are able and available for work and generally must provide 
evidence of an active search for work. Benefits will be denied in any 
week that a claimant is unable to meet these requirements. Addition 
ally, claimants may not turn down an offer of suitable work. Such a 
refusal will lead to a disqualification from benefits for not only that 
week, but for a specified number of weeks following the refusal. In 
many states, this disqualification is for the remainder of the unemploy 
ment spell. Exact procedures for denying benefits also vary by state, 
but, again, share common characteristics. Indications that continuing 
eligibility requirements are possibly not being met are investigated, 
and, following this fact-finding process, a formal hearing takes place. 
The determination may then be appealed, with most states providing 
two levels of appeals. If the appeals process has been exhausted, the 
determination may be brought to civil court for judicial review.
The absence of standardization across states appears to reflect the 
reality that there is no single approach that is clearly dominant in all 
aspects. Rather, there are costs and benefits attendant to the different 
approaches, and these costs and benefits are likely to vary across states. 
Another consideration is that the costs and benefits of the various 
approaches may fall on different segments of the population. It is well 
known that the political process can generally not be relied upon to 
provide the socially optimal result, even with the assumption of "one 
man, one vote" and truthful revelation of preferences. Given the even 
more likely scenario of differential political influence of the interested 
groups, the probability of not all of the states implementing the optimal 
legislation rises dramatically. Thus, a significant source of variation 
across states may well be differences in the political process.
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Empirical analyses that attempt to pin down sources of variation in 
state laws, and in denials and appeals for continuing eligibility issues 
have generally provided disappointing results. Descriptive, yet in- 
depth, analyses of specific states have tended to be more successful at 
pointing to major causes of differences across states. These two obser 
vations are not inconsistent, since the descriptive analyses tend to pin 
point factors that are difficult to quantify and thus have been excluded 
from the simpler empirical exercises. Overall, a deeper understanding 
of the issues that must be considered when deciding among the differ 
ent approaches is likely to provide the most useful information on the 
variance across states. Consequently, the main focus of this chapter has 
been on discussing these issues and on discussing the most recent evi 
dence relating to the likely costs and benefits of the choices made by 
the states.
While legislative change has generally been fairly slow, recent years 
have seen a marked acceleration in the adoption of new legislation on 
continuing eligibility. First, we have seen some states adopt a self- 
employment alternative to the work-search requirement. Second, all 
states have now begun to implement a profiling system. As part of this 
profiling system, some workers will be required to participate in reem- 
ployment services in order to maintain eligibility for benefits. Each of 
these changes was influenced by the results of random assignment 
experiments estimating the costs and benefits of different approaches. 
Careful testing of proposed legislation of this type is to be commended 
and encouraged. Additionally, study of the results of the actual imple 
mentation of these programs should be a high priority in the future.
NOTES
I thank Phil Levme, Chris O'Leary, and Henry Felder for their comments on earlier drafts of 
this chapter
1 See Blaustem (1993) for a complete discussion of the evolution of the UI system in the 
United States.
2 The question of whether such insurance should be privately purchased or publicly provided 
is beyond the scope of this chapter Note that an additional five states (California, Hawaii, New 
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and Puerto Rico) run a separate disability insurance program that 
provides benefits for workers unable to work due to nonwork-related disability.
3. Pages 285 to 288 discuss this issue in detail. For the most part the points raised remain valid 
today
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4 As before, the question of whether these should be privately purchased or publicly provided 
is beyond the scope of this chapter
5. The federal taxable wage base is currently just $7,500, although states can and do set higher 
levels Chapter 8 of this volume discusses this issue in more detail.
6 Meyer (1995) reviews the UI experiments in general, although training issues are not dis 
cussed in depth.
7 See the full report for more details on the design and implementation of the experiment.
8. Levy and Murnane (1992) review the evidence for increasing earnings differentials among 
college-educated and noncollege-educated workers. Additionally, estimates of the return to educa 
tion rise anywhere from 13 to 19 percent in studies using instrumental variables techniques to 
adjust for measurement error For example, see Card (1993) and Butcher and Case (1994).
9 States differ in the mechanics of certifying continuing eligibility. Often, a claimant must 
send in a postcard on a regular basis. This practice can have interesting repercussions. For exam 
ple, in Illinois—and many other states—the claimant must file every two weeks As a result, anal 
ysis of the Illinois bonus experiment revealed that the hazard spikes every two weeks. See, for 
example, Meyer (1988) and Levme (1991).
10. See Meyer (1995) for more details on the design and outcomes of each of the experiments, 
which took place in Charleston, South Carolina and in New Jersey, Washington, Nevada, and Wis 
consin.
11. Detailed discussions of the genesis of these demonstrations can be found in Wandner 
(1992), and a summary of the results is in Benus, Wood, and Grover (1994)
12. One should note, though, that requiring even claimants expecting recall to search may pro 
vide some benefits: individuals may enter into a more productive and/or more stable job match 
than the one to which they expect to be recalled.
13 According to a study by Katz and Meyer (1990), this fraction is almost 72 percent.
14 See U S Department of Labor (1994a) for more specific information regarding the stipula 
tions made by different states.
15 For the case of variable week disqualifications, the exact number of weeks is set at the 
time the determination is made.
16 Florida and North Carolina have aspects of both variable and durational disqualifications 
and thus are each counted twice.
17. All of the statistics on appeals presented in this section are from ACUC (1996)
18 Note that this discussion refers to both nonseparation and separation issues, since the two 
were not reported individually However, the majority of employer appeals concern separation 
issues. Also, for claimant appeals of nonseparation issues, the state is often the secondary party to 
the dispute, rather than the employer.
19. All quotes from the Employers Group are taken from their Web page at httpV/www.hron- 
line org/info/mfo.htm.
20 This study uses the same basic data as the other studies from Wisconsin, but the source of 
the difference is difficult to pinpoint It does appear that a lower percentage of the appeals from 
this study are coded as having representation, and that the total number of appeals is slightly 
higher
21 Anne Case and Tim Besley provided me with the political variables (see Besley and Case 
1994), while the ERI and reserve ratio multiples were obtained from Vroman (1994, tables 5 and 
3), respectively. Since Nebraska has an atypical state legislative structure, it is excluded from the 
analysis
22. A rule of thumb for determining statistical significance is that the reported coefficient be at 
least twice as large as the reported standard error
23. I would like to thank Walter Corson for providing me with the rates for 1991. The 1982 
rates are from table 2 1 in Corson, Hershey, and Kerachsky (1986)
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